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NOTES
Shacking Up with The First Amendment: Symbolic
Expression and the Public University
[I]t is in the area of student expression and association that the univ-
ersity's disciplinary power poses its greatest threat to society, to the
university itself, and possibly to the individual student.,
INTRODUCTION
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. ' 2
Interpreting and applying this provision, the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that first amendment freedoms are not absolute.3
Interesting questions about the scope and meaning of the first amendment
continue to arise when the governmental interest in regulation collides with
an individual's right to express himself. In the last several years, a novel
and complex issue of free expression has developed on the campuses of
public universities across the nation.4 In response to South African apartheid
1. Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky.
L.J. 643, 643 (1966).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The first amendment was held to apply to state action by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating that "[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic"). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)
(stating that "[w]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... are absolutes")
(citation omitted).
For a contrary position, see Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 56 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black was one of the strongest judicial advocates of the view that first amendment rights are
absolute. However, even under this theory, it is only "speech" that deserves absolute protection
and some conduct may not be sheltered. An initial determination as to whether expression
constitutes "speech" may amount to no more than covert balancing judgments. See Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes". A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 549
(1962); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L.
Rav. 428 (1967).
4. This Note will consider only the implications with respect to public schools. However,
many aspects of its discussion may also be relevant to private institutions.
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and in an effort to persuadeuniversities to initiate a divestment policy, 5
students have erected shanties 6 on university campuses.
The place and manner of student expression present a unique combination
of competing interests and hinge on an interplay among several areas of
first amendment doctrine. Recently two district court cases have addressed
the use of shanties as expression: Students Against Apartheid Coalition v.
O'NeiP and University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson.,
After engaging in a balancing analysis, the courts in both cases upheld the
students' first amendment interest, placing a burden on the universities to
draw their regulations with greater precision.
The Supreme Court has long struggled to set forth a framework with
which to analyze issues of free expression. The result is a bifurcated
approach which utilizes varying levels of judicial scrutiny depending on
whether the regulation at issue is related to the suppression of free expression
and whether the use of a public forum is involved.9 Although several basic
principles have emerged, free speech cases often "involve more than one
value of constitutional dimension, and the resolution cannot be a mechanical
process."l 0
Several recent Supreme Court decisions involving content-neutral govern-
ment regulations, however, appear to have forsaken the balancing approach.
Extreme deference has been given to regulating agencies under the rubric
5. "Divestment is the selling of securities or other holdings in corporations which man-
ufacture, produce, operate, or otherwise do business in the Republic of South Africa.
Divestment has been advocated . . . as a means for investors to oppose the racist practices
of the South African government, a regime whose power is arguably maintained in part by
foreign investments." Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 335
(W.D. Va. 1987) (emphasis in original).
6. "Shanties are flimsy, shack-like wooden structures, approximately four feet deep, eight
feet wide, and eight feet high, with or without walls, floors, or roof, and not fixed or fastened
to the ground. Although large enough to hold several people, shanties are not built to serve
as dwellings, but as symbolic and evocative lifesize representations, for illustrative, educative
and persuasive purposes, of the dwellings of black South Africans in the ghettoes of apartheid."
Id. at 336 (emphasis in original).
7. 660 F. Supp. 333.
8. 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986).
9. In analyzing a content-based regulation, one which is related to the suppression of free
expression, the speech is protected unless it falls into an unprotected category. See New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)
(fighting words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement to unlawful action);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). The regulation may also be sustained
if the government can show a "compelling" reason for the infringement on expression.
Furthermore, the Court has upheld "channeling" mechanisms which are content-based but do
not amount to a total prohibition of the expression. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
When the regulation is content-neutral, one unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
the Court has engaged in a balancing of the competing interests. This balancing generally has
not been as rigorous as when a content-based regulation is involved. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
10. G. GuNTrim, CoNsTiTUTIONAL LAW 972 (l1th ed. 1985).
[Vol. 64:711
SYMBOLIC SPEECH
of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and the consequence has
been an unfortunate diminution in the protection of first amendment
claims." The shantytown context illustrates that such a deferential approach
is inappropriate when applied to student expression in the public university
setting and, therefore, invites reconsideration.
This Note explores the implications involved in regulating the use of
shanties as first amendment expression and explains why a return to more
rigorous balancing is essential to the protection of symbolic expression in
the public university. Section I discusses the first amendment interests and
the public forum doctrine as they apply to the public university and its
educational mission. Section II focuses on the symbolic nature of shanties.
Section III examines the standards utilized by the Court to determine what
constitutes a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation, the appropriate
degree of scrutiny, and its proper application to expression within the
university context. This Note concludes with a proposal for heightened
protection of first amendment communicative conduct, such as the erection
and display of shanties, in the public university forum.
I. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY
"The first amendment applies with full vigor on the campus of a public
university."' 2 Students are "persons" under the Constitution whether they
are in or out of the classroom. 13 Although a state university clearly possesses
the power to regulate the use of its campus, it may not do so "without
regard to the Constitution."14
A. The Character of the University as a Public Forum
First amendment analysis of public forum issues involves a twofold
inquiry. First, one must determine whether a public forum exists. 5 Then,
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
12. Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rlv. 1027, 1037 (1969).
13. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). "It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
14. Dunkel v. Elkins, 325 F. Supp. 1235, 1242 (D. Md. 1971). See Hammond v. South
Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947, 949 (D. S.C. 1967) ("[C]olleges, like all other
institutions, are subject to the Constitution. Academic progress and academic freedom demand
their share of constitutional protection."). See also AiEXANDER & SOLOMON, COLLEGE AND
UNrvERsny LAW 415-25 (1972).
15. "Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of government property without regard
to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's
activities." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985).
1989]
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one must determine what restrictions may legitimately be imposed on the
public forum.' 6 In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educator's
Association,17 the Supreme Court set forth an elaborate framework for
analysis of public forum claims. The Perry framework provides for three
categories of public property: the traditional public forum, the designated
public forum, and the nonpublic forum. I" A brief overview of the doctrine
will demonstrate the importance of classifying the campus of a public
university as a public forum for free expression.
Traditional public forums consist of streets, parks, sidewalks and other
places which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions."' 19 In these "quintessential" public forums, any infringement on free
expression must be balanced against the government interest in regulation,
and a "thumb" is to be placed on the first amendment side of the scale.2
If the regulation is content-based, the state must satisfy strict scrutiny. If
the restriction is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, however, the
state may meet the lesser requirements of time, place and manner regula-
tion.2 '
The second category of public property which may be used for expressive
purposes is the designated public forum.2" This is property which the state
has opened for use by the public to engage in expressive activity. 23 Once
such a forum has been opened, it is generally subject to the same principles
that apply to traditional pubolic forums: Content-based regulations must
satisfy strict scrutiny, but time, place and manner restrictions are permis-
sible.24
16. Newell, Use of Campus Facilities for First Amendment Activity, 9 J. C. & UNIv. L.
27, 30 (1982-83).
17. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
18. Id. at 45-46.
19. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983) (sidewalk outside the Supreme Court building is a public forum); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
20. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 28.
21. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. "For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end." (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
Restrictions as to the time, place and manner of expression may be enforced if they are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. Id.; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980). See also infra notes 98-108 and accompanying
text.
22. The term "limited public forum" refers to determination of access based on subject
matter or speaker identity. See infra note 136.
23. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
24. Id. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that university meeting
facilities opened to student groups constitute a public forum and that exclusion of religious
groups was an impermissible content-based exclusion).
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Not all public property qualifies as a public forum for expression. When
property is found to be a nonpublic forum, very different standards apply.
Government regulations need only be reasonable but must not constitute
viewpoint discrimination.2 By labeling certain property as a nonpublic
forum, the state is given a broad license to regulate, and the first amendment
claim will almost inevitably fail.26
Whether a particular area is a public forum for expression depends on
the nature of the place, its normal activities, and whether it historically has
been dedicated to the exercise of first amendment rights.27 Implicit in these
decisions is a balancing of the individual's interest in engaging in expression
against the government's interest in denying access to certain areas.
B. Public Forum Analysis Applied to the University
The campus of a public university is of a much different character than
streets, parks and other traditional public forums.n Unlike traditional public
forums, the mission of the university is "education." Consequently, any
use of a university campus or facility which may compete or interfere with
that mission can be prohibited. However, the contention that the campus
of a public university may qualify as a traditional public forum does warrant
further examination. 29
The rights of free speech and expression must be "applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment." 30 This concept was first
acknowledged in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District3 1 and continues to receive support whenever a first amendment
25. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. In Perry, the Court decided that school mail facilities do not
constitute a public forum and that exclusion of a teacher union from access to the facilities
does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. The Court claimed that the exclusion was based
upon the "'status" of the unions rather than their views. "Implicit in the concept of the
nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and
speaker identity." Id. at 49 (emphasis in original).
26. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (utility poles held not
to be a public forum and city could lawfully order the removal of political campaign posters
attached to them). This decision has been severely criticized. See Quadres, Content-Neutral
Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic State Interest, the Fall of Judicial
Scrutiny, 37 HAsTIGs L.J. 439 (1986).
27. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 at 116-17 (1972); Spartacus Youth League v. Board
of Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
28. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 n.5.
29. A logical extension of the categorization approach articulated in Perry is that certain
areas of a university campus have a stronger case for public forum status than others. For
example, a campus lawn or student union may be a place which has "immemorially been held
in trust. . . for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing
public questions." See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
30. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
31. 393 U.S. 503.
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challenge arises in the educational context.12 Still, the "special characteristics
of the school environment," as well as the meaning of "education,"
necessarily differ depending upon the level of education.3 3 The concerns of
elementary school administrators are clearly not identical to the concerns
of those administering a public university. Likewise, the interests of ele-
mentary students are different from those interests of college students.34
The definition of "education" in a public university cannot be confined
to that which is dictated in the classroom.3 5 One commentator has noted:
That part of the student critique of the university which most deserves
our attention bears upon what we teach, how we teach it, and the terms
on which it is taught. One of the interesting things their critique points
out is that our building programs, corporate investments, relationships
to the immediate community and to the society, and our views of
citizenship inside the university, all turn out to be projections and
applications of what we call or have called education.36
Inherent in the tradition of the university is a strong commitment to the
expression of diverse views on various subjects. "The college classroom
with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."' 3 7
Maximum exposure to a vigorous interchange of ideas "which discovers
truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,"'38 lies at the heart of a university
education. 39
Whether the campus of a public university is a traditional or a designated
public forum is really a debate of form over substance, as the analysis for
32. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 n.5; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116; Spartacus Youth
League, 502 F. Supp. at 799.
33. Tinker involved secondary education and Grayned involved a claim arising in the high
school context. Widmar, however, involved a claim in the context of a public university.
34. College students are less susceptible to indoctrination and persuasion than are students
in elementary and secondary schools. Moreover, college students are better equipped to
understand and discuss complex social issues.
35. Tension, conflict of ideas, confrontation-all are acceptable, but massive
disruption and coercion and violence are certainly not what people have had in
mind when they have talked about education through crisis .... Nevertheless,
it is clear that the way in which a crisis or potential crisis is handled is a
profound and widespread educational lesson for the immediate university com-
munity and for the general public.
Zumwinkle, An Administrator's View, in LAW AND DisciPLINE ON CAMPus 14 (G. Holmes ed.
1971).
36. W. BIRENBAUM, SOMETING FOR EVERYBODY Is NOT ENOUGH 67 (1971), also cited in
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 198 (1972) (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J.) (emphasis
added).
37. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180.
38. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
39. The public university has been acknowledged as an "arena in which accepted, dis-
counted--even repugnant-beliefs, opinions and ideas challenge each other." Good v. Asso-
ciated Students of the Univ. of Washington, 86 Wash. 2d 94, 105, 542 P.2d 762, 769 (1975).
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both is substantially the same. 40 Although much depends on what a particular
university has done to open its property and facilities for expressive con-
duct, 41 a significant number of cases has determined that, as to students
and student groups, the public university is at minimum a designated public
forum. 42 Once public forum status is conferred, the university cannot, within
constitutional strictures, arbitrarily curtail the right of students to lawfully
exercise their first amendment guarantees on university property.43
II. SYMBOLIC CONDUCT AS PROTECTED EXPRESSION
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that communicative conduct may
be considered "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and, therefore, is entitled
to comprehensive first amendment protection.45 Symbolic expression is con-
duct in which the medium is the expression itself." Conduct as communi-
cation often proves to be an extremely effective mode for the transmission
of ideas. 47
Yet, the protection of communicative conduct is not without limits. In
United States v. O'Brien," the Court refused to accept the view that "an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea . 49 The
Court upheld this proposition several years later in Spence v. Washington. 0
The Spence decision set forth a two-pronged analysis in an effort to
40. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
41. Most public universities have a policy provision which dedicates certain areas of the
campus to expression on all subjects.
42. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5 (1981); University of Utah Students Against Apartheid
v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (D. Utah 1986); Dunkel, 325 F.Supp. 1235. See Students
Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 338 (W.D. Va. 1987); Spartacus
Youth League, 502 F. Supp. at 798; Brubaker v. Moelchert, 405 F. Supp. 837 (W.D.N.C.
1975). See also Newell, supra note 16.
43. Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 1970).
44. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
45. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
46. Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 CoTut. L. Rv. 467,
471 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Ambiguous Conduct].
47. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (Flags as symbolic expression
are "a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas," and "a short cut from mind to
mind."). In many instances, expressive conduct may add an emotive dimension that words
alone cannot capture.
See also Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 46, at 470-71. ("Protection of conduct as
an additional channel of communication serves three important first amendment functions."
It permits larger and more diverse groups to communicate, promotes communication of a
wider variety of messages, and exposes a larger group of people to the same communication.).
48. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
49. Id. at 376. In the O'Brien case, the Court upheld a conviction for burning a draft
card, yet never decided whether the conduct constituted protected symbolic expression.
50. 418 U.S. 405.
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distinguish protected, symbolic speech from other forms of conduct.
A. The Spence Analysis5'
The initial inquiry under the Spence analysis is whether the communicator
intends to convey a particularized message by engaging in certain conduct.12
The intent of the communicator is a subjective requirement which serves to
ensure that the individual has a legitimate interest in the expression and
that the conduct is not simply an act of "mindless nihilism. 53 In Spence,
a college student was convicted of taping a large peace symbol on an
American flag and then hanging that flag upside down from his apartment
window. Spence maintained that he engaged in this conduct to express his
anguish over the then-current Cambodian incursion and the resulting Kent
State tragedy.54 In overturning the conviction, the Court found that "an
intent to convey a particularized message was present. ' 55
The second query under the Spence test is whether, in light of surrounding
circumstances, the likelihood is great that the message will be understood
by those observing it.56 This prong places great emphasis on the context5 7
in which a symbol is used as expression. 8 In Spence, the student's activity
was "roughly simultaneous" with two issues of "great public moment." 9
The Court acknowledged that it is context which furnishes meaning to the
conduct: "[A] flag bearing a peace symbol and displayed upside down by
a student today might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior,
51. In symbolic speech cases, unlike other first amendment claims of free expression, the
challenger must establish that the conduct is communication before the court will entertain a
first amendment challenge. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.
52. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
53. Id. at 410.
54. Id. at 408.
55. Id. at 410-11.
56. Id. at 411. Under the Spence approach it should be sufficient if the observer is aware
that the conduct is "a" communication. To require that the observer understand the exact
message the actor intends by his conduct would subject symbolic speech to a more stringent
standard than is required for words alone. For example, a man who exclaims, "We need
peace!" is undoubtedly engaging in protected expression despite the fact that a listener might
not understand exactly what he means.
57. In considering context, it is necessary to ascertain what the conduct is, who is engaging
in it, to whom the expression is directed, and whether those persons would be likely to
understand its significance.
58. Context has been all important in determining claims of symbolic expression. In Tinker,
school children wearing black armbands were held to have conveyed an unmistakable message
about the Vietnam situation, which, at the time, was of great public concern. 393 U.S. at
505-14. Likewise, in Street, 394 U.S. 576, upon hearing a news report that civil rights leader
James Meredith had been shot, a black man set fire to an American flag on a street corner.
Although the Court based its decision on the words spoken as the flag was burned, it seems
clear that the conduct would probably have been considered protected symbolic expression.
59. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
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but it would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss
the drift of appellant's point at the time he made it."' 6
B. Shanties as Symbolic Conduct
When the Spence analysis is applied to shanties,61 it becomes apparent
that shanties are symbolic expression and are protected by the first amend-
ment. Both district court cases that have addressed the issue concluded
likewise.62 However, the significance of this particular manner of expression
would be undermined without a closer look at why this result is true.6 1
Applying the first prong of the Spence analysis to shanties makes it obvious
that the subjective intent requirement is satisfied.6 In Peterson and O'Neil,
the student groups clearly intended to convey a particularized, political
message by engaging in the erection and display of the shanties. 6 The
unique character of the structures made it clear that the only substantial
benefits of the shacks67 were expressive. 6 Shanties are not merely facilitative69
60. Id.
61. See supra note 6.
62. In University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D.
Utah 1986), the court applied the Spence analysis to reach its conclusion that shanties are a
form of protected symbolic expression. In Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil,
660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987), the analysis was never undertaken as both parties stipulated
this fact. In support, the court cited Peterson. Id. at 337.
63. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 302 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A realistic appraisal of the
competing interests at stake. . . requires a closer look at the nature of the expressive conduct
at issue and the context in which that conduct would be displayed.").
64. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
65. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
66. Most, if not all, of the shanties had writings and drawings on their exteriors, explaining
the protest of South African apartheid and calling for university divestment.
67. At some universities the protestors lived in the shanties. This is arguably facilitative
and may raise further questions as to whether the "living" aspect should also deserve first
amendment protection. The Supreme Court has refrained from deciding this question. See
infra note 69. The living accommodations probably would not constitute a substantial benefit,
but would be incidental to the expressive benefits of the shanties.
68. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. at 1204. The court noted that "imn this sense they are similar
to oral or written communication which rarely, if ever, is resorted to for any other reason
than to express ideas." Id. at 1204 n.8.
69. See Clark, 468 U.S. 288. In Clark the Supreme Court expressed an unwillingness to
decide that sleeping, as part of a protest to demonstrate the plight of the homeless, constitutes
protected symbolic speech. "We assume for present purposes, but do not decide that such is
the case." Id. at 293 (emphasis added). The reason for this hesitance is that the primary value
of allowing the protestors to sleep at the demonstration site would have been facilitative. Id.
at 296. See also State v. Ybarra, 25 Or. App. 633, 550 P.2d 763 (1976) (Student protestors
set up several tents and sleeping bags on the library lawn of a university, asserting that they
would remain there until their demands were met. The court viewed the tents as having a
facilitative rather than expressive function.).
For a view that facilitative conduct may also be used for expressive purposes, see Clark,
468 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 46.
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nor incidental to the expression. 70 "[R]ather, they effectively serve as the
speech itself. ' 71 The message of the shanties is focused; the subject matter
of the demonstrations is precise, and the intended audience is readily
ascertainable. 72 This combination of factors is convincing evidence of the
protestors' intent to communicate.
Similarly, the understanding observer requirement 7" is satisfied. It would
be difficult to argue that passers-by observing this visual blight are unaware
of the purpose of the shanties and the message they convey. The use of
such structures to symbolize the plight of South African blacks in the
ghettos of apartheid has proven to be an extremely effective means of
communication. 74 Evidence of their effectiveness is the strong media atten-
tion and coverage which shanties have received. 75 Attention by the media is
a strong indicator of "observer understanding because it highlights the
communicative nature of the very form of conduct undertaken. ' 76 Moreover,
the unique appearance of the shanties should alert the observer as to their
meaning, 77 especially when the intended audience is university administrators,
trustees, faculty and students.7 8 The "nature of [the protestors'] activity,
70. "They are not like a table, booth, kiosk or other temporary structure from which
protected speech can be disseminated." Peterson, 649 F. Supp. at 1204.
71. Id.
72. Vague and unfocused claims of symbolic speech cannot satisfy the first part of the
Spence analysis and are, therefore, not protected. See White House Vigil for the ERA Comm.
v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1538-41 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Leaving parcels unattended on the sidewalk
in front of the White House was not shown to involve an intent to convey a particularized
message.); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032
(1972) ("[W]earing of long hair is not akin to pure speech. At the most it is symbolic speech
indicative of expressions of individuality rather than a contribution to the storehouse of
ideas."); DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 616 F. Supp. 971, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (A man
jogging without a shirt claimed he was communicating a philosophy about "health, fitness
and the oneness of mind and body." The court found the message not to be particularized
and also found that the likelihood of observer understanding was doubtful.).
73. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
74. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. at 1205. "While the mass media often pays little attention to
unorthodox or unpopular ideas, dramatic displays of action capture media attention when
words alone will not." Id. at 1205 n.9. See Note, Ambiguous Conduct, supra note 46, at 471.
75. See, e.g., Conant, Divisions over Divestments, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1986, at 66;
Seligman, Shantyism: Students Protesting U.S. Investments, FoRTUNE, June 9, 1986, at 156;
Milioy, Shantytown Protests on the Campus, Wash. Post, May 6, 1986, at B3; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 10, 1986, § 1, at 12, col. 2 (photo of shanty on Dartmouth campus); Williams, Pressure
Rises on Colleges to Withdraw South Africa Interests, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, § 1, at 14,
col. 2.
76. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. at 1205 n.10.
77. Shanties are erected to be purposeful eyesores. This reflects a desire to contrast the
ugly conditions of the South African blacks with the extremely attractive conditions that
prevail on America's college campuses. See, e.g., O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. at 336. The mere
appearance is sufficient to make an average observer curious as to what the shanties are and
why they are there. In addition, the writings and drawings on the exterior of the shanties
make their purpose extremely clear.
78. Shantytown protestors believe that a proper response to apartheid is university divest-
ment. See supra note 5. The university administrators must be aware of this request and the
request is effectively repeated each time administrators observe the shanties. Similarly, most
faculty and university students are also aware of the issue.
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combined with the factual context and environment in which it was under-
taken, lead to the conclusion that [they] engaged in a form of protected
expression," 79 just as affixing a peace symbol on a flag, 0 and wearing black
armbands constituted protected protests to the Vietnam War.81
III. REGULATION AS TO Tnm, PLACE AND MANNER
Even assuming that the erection and display of shanties are found to be
protected, and even though they occur in a public forum, the expression
remains subject to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner.82
Nonetheless, infringement of constitutional rights is inherent in any regu-
lation. Thus, the Court has promulgated certain standards to operate as
safeguards for protected expression when determining the constitutionality
of content-neutral government regulations. Recent application of these tests
illustrates the confusion in contemporary first amendment analysis.83 The
Court no longer "read[s] these tests as written," and the consequence has
been diminished protection for first amendment expression 4
A. Safeguards for Expression: The Applicable Standards
1. The O'Brien Approach: Least Restrictive Means
In United States v. O'Brien,85 the Supreme Court upheld a government
regulation which prohibited knowing destruction or mutilation of a Selective
Service registration certificate. O'Brien had purposefully burned his certif-
icate to express his anti-war belief and was subsequently convicted. The
Court never actually determined whether O'Brien had engaged in symbolic
speech, but sustained the conviction on the basis that the regulation was
narrowly and precisely drawn to protect "the Government's substantial
interest in an efficient and easily administered system for raising armies, 8s6
79. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10.
80. See Spence, 418 U.S. 405; Street, 394 U.S. 576.
81. See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
82. This includes expression which is "oral or written or symbolized by conduct." Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). See City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
83. See supra text accompanying note 12.
84. Note, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence: First Amendment Safeguards-
Their Sum is Less Than Their Parts, 39 U. MIA L. Rav. 997, 1015 (1985).
85. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
86. Id. at 381-82.
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and that O'Brien had willfully frustrated this interest. The Court established
a four-part test to determine permissible government regulation of com-
municative conduct:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest. "7
The "no greater than essential" requirement of the O'Brien test closely
parallels a least restrictive means analysis. A case often cited in support of
a least restrictive means analysis is Schneider v. State.88 In Schneider, a city
had enacted four ordinances forbidding the distribution of leaflets, claiming
that the bans were necessary to prevent littering. Justice Robert's majority
opinion held the ordinances unconstitutional because the city could employ
less restrictive means to achieve its purpose without infringing on the
freedom of speech. 9 Likewise, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Commission," the Court stated that "if [a] governmental interest
could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech,
the excessive restrictions cannot survive.''91
Several cases in the educational context suggest the Court's endorsement
of something akin to a least restrictive means analysis. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,9 2 the Court extolled the
values of free expression in a democratic society and stated that "[tlhe
Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the
right to free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly read
it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in care-
fully restricted circumstances." 93 Grayned v. Rockford94 reiterated the
87. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
88. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
89. "There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment
of those who actually throw papers on the streets." Id. at 162.
90. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
91. Id. at 564. The Court held as unconstitutional a ban on promotional advertising by
an electrical utility. The decision was supported in part because the Commission had not
demonstrated that its interest could not be protected by narrower restrictions. Id. at 570. This
seems to suggest a burden on the government to show that it has employed the "least restrictive
means." See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Once a governmental
regulation is shown to impinge upon basic First Amendment rights the burden falls on the
government to show ...the absence of less intrusive alternatives."). It is also noteworthy
that in Central Hudson the least restrictive means analysis was applied to commercial speech,
which is considered to be lower-valued expression.
92. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
93. Id. at 513. In a case involving the first amendment associational rights of state-
supported teachers, the Court held that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
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Tinker holding and upheld an "antinoise" regulation proscribing boister-
ous demonstrations outside a school building during those hours in which
the school is in session.95 The Court found that the ordinance was
"narrowly tailored" to the city's interest in having an uninterrupted
school session conducive to the students' learning and that it did not
"unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights." 96 The Court stated:
The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time. Our cases make clear that in assessing the reasonableness of a
regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is in-
volved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the State's
legitimate interest2'
Under Grayned, "narrowly tailored" appears to coincide with the concept
of "least restrictive means."
2. The Time, Place and Manner Approach: Narrowly Tailored
and Alternative Channels of Communication
For cases not involving symbolic expression, the Court has employed a
different analysis, which it has referred to as "time, place and manner
regulation." The doctrine of time, place and manner states that incidental
restrictions on expression are valid provided that the regulations are content-
neutral, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels of communica-
tion.98
Assuming that a regulation is content-neutral,9 a regulation must also be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. This standard
was designed to protect expression from unnecessary, over-intrusive regu-
lation. However, the definition of "narrowly tailored" remains ambiguous.
The application of this prong is thus subject to diverse results.
Arguably, the test for time, place and manner is more speech-protective
than O'Brien. It maintains the basic O'Brien indicia and contributes an
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (emphasis added).
94. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
95. Id. at 120.
96. Id. at 119. The regulation applied only to n oisy picketing and demonstration during
school hours. It involved no restriction on such activity at other times, in other places, or if
the expression itself was quiet. Id. at 119-20.
97. Id. at 116-17 (citation omitted).
98. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808; Grace, 461 U.S. at
177; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48; Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S.
at 535; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
99. See supra note 9, paragraph 2.
1989]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
additional safeguard by requiring alternative channels of expression.'0° How-
ever, such an interpretation of "narrowly tailored" was explicitly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Regan v. Time, Inc.01 Instead "narrowly tailored"
appears to mean no more than "substantially serves"'12 or "more likely
than not." 103
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, °4 the National Park
Service had a regulation prohibiting "camping" in certain national parks.
A renewable permit was issued to a group of demonstrators who wished to
protest the plight of the homeless. The demonstrators were allowed to erect
symbolic tents and maintain a twenty-four hour vigil, but they were not
allowed to sleep in the tents. Even though the Court assumed that sleeping
was protected symbolic expression, 05 it upheld the restriction as a valid
time, place and manner regulation. Once the regulation was found to be
content-neutral and the governmental interests substantial, extreme deference
was given to the Park Service as to the means chosen tofurther its interests.
The Court stated:
If the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the National
Parks are adequately protected, which we think it has, and if the parks
would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than
with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment
as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may
be carried out.' °6
Thus, it appears that the majority's analysis abandoned any meaningful
construction of "narrowly tailored." Under this approach, a content-neutral
government regulation is valid if it simply "furthers a substantial govern-
mental interest." The decision has generated much criticism. Dissatisfaction
has been expressed about the majority's failure to give serious consideration
to the symbolic speech issue,' °7 as well as the deference shown to government
regulation when faced with a claim of free expression. 08
3. Clark versus O'Brien
The Clark decision is susceptible to attack because it confuses the tests
applicable to content-neutral regulations. In Clark, the Court used a watered-
100. See Quadres, supra note 26, at 448-49.
101. 468 U.S. 641, 656-57 (1984) ("The less-restrictive-alternative analysis invoked by Time
has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place and manner regulation.").
102. Id. ("It is enough that the color restriction substantially serves the Government's
ends.")
103. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 291.
104. 468 U.S. 288.
105. See supra note 69.
106. Clark, 468 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).
107. See supra notes 63 and 69.
108. See supr notes 26, 84; Note, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence: The
Demise of First Amendment Protection for Symbolic Speech, 36 MERCER L. Rav. 1371, 1393
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Demise of First Amendment].
[Vol. 64:711
SYMBOLIC SPEECH
down version of the reasonable time, place and manner balancing test to
analyze the sleeping prohibition, yet proceeded to sustain the regulation
under the O'Brien approach. The Court stated that the four-factor O'Brien
test "in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied
to time, place or manner restrictions."'' 09 However, little support for such
a conclusion exists." 0
The O'Brien test requires that the regulation further a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and that the incidental restriction on expression is no
greater than essential. The time, place and manner doctrine requires only
that a regulation be narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental
interest. If "narrowly tailored" means something less than "no greater than
essential," O'Brien is clearly the more speech-protective approach."' Because
Clark involved a claim of symbolic speech, the O'Brien analysis should
properly have been applied in the first instance.
Another requirement for a valid time, place and manner regulation is
that the regulation leave open ample alternative channels of communica-
tion. 12 Ensuring that the communicator has alternative means of expression
appears to be a speech-protective provision. Yet the application of this
requirement has provided additional support for content-neutral government
regulation of expression.
The Court sustained a Los Angeles ordinance which prohibited the posting
of signs on public property in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent."'
The governmental interest in aesthetics" 4 was found to outweigh the first
amendment rights of those who wished to use utility poles for the posting
of political campaign posters. The Court stated that "[w]hile the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable
method of communication at all times and in all places, a restriction on
expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication
are inadequate. ""5 In defining what constitutes an "adequate" alternative
mode of communication, two basic principles have emerged: first, that every
citizen has the right to "reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so
there must be an opportunity to win their attention, ' " 6 and second, that
when a public forum is involved, it is irrelevant that the expression may be
109. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
110. See Note, Demise of First Amendment, supra note 108.
111. See supra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying note 98.
113. 466 U.S. at 118.
114. See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text. For an interesting and thoughtful article
on aesthetic regulation, see Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of
the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. R-v. 355 (1982).
115. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 (citation omitted).
116. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
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exercised elsewhere.'" 7 Difficult and troubling questions remain as towhether
the available alternative modes of communication must be equally effective" 8
and must not involve greater expense and difficulty." 9
Inherent to a determination that alternative channels of expression are
available is a valuation of the particular mode of communication at issue.
A court must determine whether adequate substitutes exist, which necessarily
involves subjective judgments as to the cost, efficiency and effectiveness of
the means employed. When symbolic expression is at issue, an inquiry into
alternative modes of communication is especially suspect. If a medium is,
in fact, the message itself, no adequate substitutes exist. This is implicitly
recognized in the O'Brien test for content-neutral regulation of symbolic
expression, which has no counterpart similar to the "alternative channels
of communication" inquiry of the time, place and manner analysis.
B. The University Interests in Regulation of Shanties
A public university occupies a unique position as a forum for free
expression arising out of a distinct tension between two highly valued
institutions in American society: the first amendment and the public uni-
versity.120 Although the case for free expression emerges with great force in
the context of the public university, university administrators have a strong
117. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163 ("[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.") See also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 ("The Los Angeles ordinance does
not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and distribute literature in
the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited."); Heffron, 452
U.S. at 655 ("[IThe Rule does not exclude ISKCON from the fairgrounds, nor does it deny
that organization the right to conduct any desired activity at some point within the forum.").
118. Many dissenting opinions have been filed criticizing the majority's judgment as to
which alternatives may be sufficiently effective. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he adequacy of distributing handbills is dubious ... particularly
when the message to be carried is best expressed by a few words or a graphic image, a message
on a sign will . . . reach far more people than one on a handbill.") (citation omitted);
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 660 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("By
prohibiting distribution of literature outside the booths, the fair officials sharply limit the
number of fairgoers to whom the proselytizers and candidates can communicate their mes-
sages."); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 103 (ordinance prohibiting "loud and raucous" loudspeakers
held constitutional) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[lit is an obvious fact that public speaking today
without sound amplifiers is a wholly inadequate way to reach the people on a large scale.").
119. Many people have ideas which they wish to disseminate, but they do not have enough
money to gain access to television, radio, and newspapers and cannot afford to circulate
elaborate pamphlets. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[N]ot
only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be spent distributing
them. The average cost of communicating by handbill is . . . likely to be far higher than the
average cost of communicating by poster."); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 102-03 (Black, J., dissenting).




competing interest in regulating the use of campus facilities.121 Legitimate
concerns of university administrators include, but are not limited to, the
preservation of the academic character of the campus, 122 the maintenance
of security, the protection of the rights of others with respect to the use of
campus facilities, and the physical maintenance and aesthetics of the cam-
pus.Iu Each of these four interests will be discussed in the context of
shanties erected on university campuses.
Educational institutions may regulate any conduct which "materially and
substantially interferes" with the educational process.12 However, the Court
has repeatedly advised that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." 125
Indeed, the interest in preserving the academic character of the campus was
not asserted in either Peterson or O'Neil and seems unlikely to arise in the
shanty context for two reasons. First, unlike Tinker, where the expressive
conduct took place in the classroom, shanties are erected and displayed
outside of university buildings, usually on campus grounds. Second, the
shanties do not create any substantial amount of noise nor are they apt to
draw students attention away from classroom instruction. 1  Thus, preser-
vation of the academic character of the campus is dubious as a justification
for suppression of expressive conduct in the context of shanties.
Maintaining campus security is clearly a legitimate interest of university
administrators. 27 A threat to security is always present whenever there is
effective communication of an extremely controversial message. The Su-
preme Court has noted:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any
variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, . . . or on the campus, that deviates from the views
of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But
our Constitution says [that] we must take this risk; and our history says
that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that
is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor
of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious society.128
121. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117-19; Tinker,
393 U.S. at 507. See also Newell, supra note 16.
122. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 n.5; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117-18; Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
123. See generally Newell, supra note 16.
124. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
125. Id. at 508.
126. See Grayned, 408 U.S. 104 (Ihe Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance when 200 people
marched on a sidewalk 100 feet from a high school building.).
127. See Newell, supra note 16, at 38.
128. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 (citation omitted).
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It is necessary to recognize that the erection and display of the shanties
does not in and of itself present a threat to campus security.2 9 Rather, it
is the response stimulated by their message which brings this interest into
focus. 130 Reaction to the shanties has certainly not been uniform. While
many university campuses have experienced little or no violent reaction, 3'
episodes of disorder on other campuses have not been uncommon.
A concern for security was asserted in University of Utah Students Against
Apartheid v. Peterson.3 2 In support of an order requiring the removal of
the shanties, the University administrators argued that the shanties exposed
the University to potentially large liability and considerable expense. 33 To
support this contention, the University detailed several violent and poten-
tially hazardous occurrences related to the shanties. 4 The court concluded
that the cancellation of liability insurance 35 and the increased cost of police
protection owing to incidents resulting from the existence of shanties, while
admittedly substantial, were insufficient to circumscribe the free speech
interest of the students. However, the court indicated that it would support
"'clearly stated reasonable and nondiscriminatory rules and regulations
regarding time, place and manner' which are not content related that will
enable the university to protect its interests while allowing the maximum
possible exercise of student expression."' 136
The semi-permanent character 37 of the shanties gives rise to another
significant concern: protecting the rights of others to use the campus grounds
129. Unlike the activities at issue in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), the
existence of the shanties is not "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
[are not] likely to incite or produce such action." If this were the case, shanties would fall
into an unprotected category of expression.
130. It is noteworthy that the reaction generated by the use of shanties evidences the
effectiveness of this particular manner of communication.
131. See, e.g., O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333. When the student groups challenged the university's
prohibition of shanties, the issue of security was never asserted.
132. 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Utah 1986).
133. Id. at 1202.
134. Id. There were two occasions on which the shanties were destroyed in nocturnal attacks.
Another incident occurred where a shanty was set on fire. Finally, a molotov cocktail was
thrown in the vicinity of the shanties.
135. See id. The University introduced evidence to show that the State Risk Management
Pool, a form of state government self-insurance, had been cancelled with respect to any
liability resulting from the existence of the shanties.
136. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267. The question of who may lawfully use a particular
forum may be decided by subject matter or speaker identification. Such is a "limited" public
forum. In the context of a public university, it is not uncommon to find use of certain facilities
limited to students and faculty.
137. Id. at 1211 (citing University Regulations, ch. x Student Code, art. III, § 2.02). Pending
the drafting of such regulations, the court exercised its equitable powers to grant some relief
to the University. As most of the disruption had occurred at night, the court ordered that the
shanties be made portable and removed at night. In awarding this relief, the court considered
the fact that the free speech interests of the students did not seem to be furthered by night
time display. Also, it was noted that the increased burden to the students was incidental to
the free speech interest.
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and facilities. Once a public forum has been generally opened for expression,
the rights of others to lawfully use the forum may not be denied.138 The
expressive rights of those who oppose the anti-apartheid demonstrations are
entitled to the same first amendment protection as those engaging in the
construction and display of shanties. 3 9 Thus, a public university has a
legitimate interest in ensuring that shanty demonstrations do not effectively
result in the exclusion Qf others who wish to use the forum for lawful
expressive activity. This issue was not addressed in either Peterson or O'Neil,
but it is likely to arise when the vehicle of expression is a semi-permanent
demonstration.
The promotion of an aesthetic environment has long been recognized as
an appropriate government interest. 40 Historically, this concern has been
asserted primarily in cases involving the constitutionality of zoning ordi-
nances. 141 More recently, the Court has also sanctioned an aesthetic interest
in deciding issues of free expression in a public forum.142 However, accep-
tance of aesthetics as a legitimate interest in the first amendment context
has generated much criticism. Aesthetic judgments have been criticized as
subjective-presenting regulating municipalities with standardless discretion
which may open the door for potential viewpoint discrimination.14 1 More-
over, when symbolic expression is involved, regulation based on an aesthetic
interest may effectively serve to undermine the manner of expression, which
138. Most shanties are constructed with an intent that they will remain until the demon-
stration is over. See supra note 6.
139. Provided, however, that their exercise of that right does not violate existing laws.
140. According to one commentator:
"Aesthetics," as the term is used in the visual beauty rationale, connotes pleasure
or offense to the sense of sight resulting from the visual form of environmental
features or settings. Consequently, aesthetic regulation's purpose is assumed to
be the creation or preservation of features or settings that are "beautiful"-
pleasing to the eye-or, conversely, the proscription of those that are "ugly"-
offensive to the eye.
Costonis, supra note 114 at 396. Professor Costoris offers an alternative definition of aesthetics
which he has termed the "cultural stability-identity rationale." Id. at 392. "Stability reasoning
concludes ... that the social impetus to which aesthetic regulation responds is the preservation
of stability-identity values." Id. at 394.
141. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
142. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789; Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490 (1981); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). These cases acknowledge
that municipalities have a strong aesthetic interest "in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant
formats for expression." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 806.
143. "Because aesthetic judgments are so subjective, . . . it is too easy for government to
enact restrictions on speech for . . . illegitimate reasons and to evade effective judicial review
by asserting that the restriction is aimed at some displeasing aspect of the speech that is not
solely communicative-for example, its sound, its appearance, or its location." Taxpayers for




is the same as regulating the message itself. 144 In O'Neil, maintaining the
architectural and natural integrity of the campus was the sole justification
asserted by the University of Virginia to support its lawn use restrictions. 45
The court's opinion suggests a hesitance to support a regulation that has
an exclusively aesthetic justification.'4
When considering the case of shanties, it becomes clear that the manner
of expression is antithetical to the university interest in maintaining the
aesthetic beauty of the campus. Shanties are designed to be visually offen-
sive; ugliness is fundamental to the communication. 47 "But the mere fact
that some find a demonstration ugly is no more reason to ban it than to
ban an idea the listener finds ugly.' 4 A regulation which provides that a
demonstration must not offend the accepted visual perception of those
viewing the university campus is tantamount to restricting the message the
protestors are allowed to convey. 49 Several dangers are inherent in such a
manner restriction. First, because shanties do constitute a visual blight, it
would be all too easy for university officials who disagree with the anti-
apartheid movement to circumscribe effective communication of this message
under the guise of a content-neutral manner regulation. 50 Second, such a
regulation would work to restrict the symbolic message itself.'5' If it were
required that shanties be erected and displayed in a manner which is not
aesthetically displeasing, transmission of this message would be curtailed
and its impact seriously weakened. Thus, the promotion of aesthetics,
advanced as a justification for regulating expression must always be closely
examined, especially when symbolic speech is at issue. 152
144. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. See also Note, Demise of First Amend-
ment, supra note 108.
145. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. at 336. The University had rules banning "any structure or
extended presence" on certain areas of the campus lawn. Id.
146. The court stated that "unlike other cases in which restrictions rooted in aesthetics also
served goals of ensuring public safety, nowhere do the defendants contend that the shanties
are inimical to the rights of others who use the campus for the purposes for which it was
created." Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
147. See supra note 77.
148. Indiana University Assembly Ground Committee Report to Dean Gordon, September
26, 1986 (on file with author).
149. "Should aesthetic measures premised exclusively on visual beauty reasoning survive a
first amendment challenge? I think not. A legislative ban on, or a preference for, private
expression based solely on its offensiveness or appeal is censorship in its baldest form."
Costonis, supra note 114, at 411 (emphasis added).
150. A facially content-neutral regulation, however, may be found to be content-based as
applied and hence unconstitutional. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
151. The key to the demonstrators' message is the ugly alid oppressive conditions suffered
by South African blacks. See supra notes 6 & 77 and accompanying text.
152. Although the modern period courts have not rejected aesthetic regulation on
substantive due process grounds, first amendment challenges furnish a context in
which the defenses' flimsiness is likely to prove fatal .... These opinions signal
that the Court now regards aesthetic regulation as no more immune to the
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C. A Return to More Rigorous Scrutiny: The Shantytown Cases
The construction and display of shanties on public university campuses
illustrate the need for more rigorous balancing to determine the respective
rights of student demonstrators and university administrators. To apply the
deferential approach currently utilized by the Court for time, place and
manner regulations153 in the context of shanties would be fatal to this
particular means of communication. If the requirement that a regulation be
"narrowly tailored" is interpreted to mean only that the regulation "sub-
stantially serves"' 54 an important university interest, any regulation of
shanties will be held valid and the first amendment guarantee will be
circumscribed. Application of this watered-down balancing test ignores the
significance of a public university as a forum for expression and is unre-
sponsive to the specific nature of the expressive conduct.
In both Peterson and O'Neil, the courts correctly applied a least restrictive
means analysis, endeavoring to strike a balance between the universities'
interests and student expression. In O'Neil, the University of Virginia had
enacted rules banning "any structure or extended presence" on areas of the
campus lawn'55 in an effort to promote the aesthetic environment of the
University. The parties stipulated that shanties are a form of protected,
symbolic expression, and the court observed "the similarity between an
open campus lawn and a traditional public forum like municipal parks."' 156
With this observation, the court then applied the ad hoc balancing test for
time, place and manner regulation. It found the lawn use regulations which
were in effect at that time unconstitutional as too vague and too broad to
satisfy the University's legitimate interests in aesthetics. Although the court
acknowledged the Clark case by stating that it "cannot purport to second
guess the University's appraisal of how much protection the campus requires
or how to attain an acceptable level of preservation,"'5 7 it proceeded to
find that the lawn use regulations were not the necessary and least restrictive
means by which to protect the aesthetic interest. The reason for employing
a least restrictive means analysis in O'Neil is two-fold. First, the court was
hesitant to allow a purely aesthetic interest abridge expressive rights. 58
Second, the court implicitly recognized that unwarranted deference to the
exacting scrutiny mandated by its first amendment jurisprudence than any other
type of legislative measure that restricts expression whose content is deemed
"offensive" by the state.
Costonis, supra note 114 at 417-18.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 98-119.
154. Id.
155. ONeil, 660 F. Supp. at 336.
156. Id. at 338.
157. Id. at 339.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 140-52.
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University would remove any protection for shanties as symbolic expression.
The O'Neil court also determined that the University failed to provide
the students with a meaningful alternative channel of expression. 159 Because
the intended audience was the Board of Visitors, relegating the shanty
protest to other lawn areas was inadequate. Furthermore, the suggestion
that the demonstrators could use the mail service, newspapers or other
media to convey their message was rejected. The court stated:
These options involve more cost and less autonomy than the shanties,
are less likely to reach the Board of Visitors who may not deliberately
be seeking information about apartheid, and might be less effective for
delivering the message that is conveyed by the sight of a shanty in front
of the Rotunda.'
In Peterson, the court acknowledged that the university interest in reducing
the "overall cost, difficulty and expense in obtaining liability insurance,
risk of physical harm, potential university liability and aesthetic concerns"
were substantial.' 6' However, the University did not have formally drawn
regulations to provide assurance that the restrictions were, in fact, content-
neutral and which would provide students with appropriate guidelines to
plan and develop their free speech activities. In dicta the court stated that
such regulations would be valid provided they "allowed the maximum
possible exercise of student expression." 162 This suggests a preference for
O'Neil's least restrictive means approach to determine the validity of content-
neutral regulations.
To understand the significance of utilizing a least restrictive means analysis
in the context of shanties in the public university, it is useful to consider
the outcome if the court had entertained Clark's more deferential approach
toward the regulations. Under the Clark approach, should a court find that
a university has a legitimate concern in aesthetics or security, and that the
university is more susceptible to these dangers without the restrictions than
with them, the regulations are safe from invalidation. This rational basis
standard of review sustains the university regulation regardless of the fact
that the student expression is completely circumscribed. It also ignores the
role of a university as an extremely valuable forum for expressive activity.
IV. PROPOSAL
This Note proposes a return to the O'Brien least restrictive means analysis'63
to determine the validity of content-neutral regulations which incidentally
159. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. at 339.
160. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. at 340. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
93 (1977) (prohibition of "For Sale" signs in front of homes in an effort to reduce "white
flight" from a neighborhood held unconstitutional as no satisfactory alternatives for the
communication were available).
161. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. at 1211.
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 85-97.
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restrict symbolic speech in a public university forum. Although O'Brien has
been regarded as the traditional analysis to be applied when symbolic speech
is at issue, this is no longer the case.'" Instead, the deferential standards
of reasonable time, place and manner analysis have become the rule for all
expression. 65 The Supreme Court has correctly noted that "[i]t would be
odd to insist on a higher standard for limitations aimed at regulable conduct,
and having only an incidental impact on speech" 6 than for more traditional
expression, such as oral or written communication. Yet, it does not neces-
sarily follow that all symbolic speech should receive diluted first amendment
protection. If a least restrictive means approach is incorporated into the
"narrowly tailored" requirement of time, place and manner analysis, a
uniform standard would enable public universities to pursue their interests
through regulation while affording greater protection for students' first
amendment rights.
When a claim of free expression is asserted, it is always appropriate to
consider the nature of the conduct at issue. If conduct is held out to be
communicative, the Spence analysis 67 should be applied. Close examination
of the first amendment interest serves a dual purpose: It serves to determine
if the expression is protected by the first amendment, and it identifies the
essential ingredients of a particular mode of expression. Until one is aware
of the value which is inherent to any specific mode of communication, it
is difficult to determine exactly where the protection should be focused.
For example, a manner restriction on shanty protests would clearly be
hostile to symbolic expression, whereas regulation as to time and place
would pose less threat to these anti-apartheid demonstrations. 61
The character of the property where the expression occurs should not be
overlooked. If the expressive behavior takes place in a public university
forum, whether traditional or designated, a least restrictive means analysis
should be employed. In effect, this is really no different than placing a
"thumb" on the first amendment side of the balance.' 69 Thus,
[t]he real challenge to the academic community should be to channel
the energies of those involved. The presence of a potential disruption
on a campus should be a challenge to find ways of utilizing the situation
as a creative educational experience. The approach should not be to
repress the activity, but if the problem is real and the motives legitimate,
the emphasis should be to sustain the activity.70
164. See supra notes 85-119 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 11.
166. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
168. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying note 21.
170. Knauss, The University's Response to Disruptive Behavior, in STUDENT PROTEST AID
=" LAW 22 (1969) (emphasis added).
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A public university occupies a unique and difficult position as a forum for
expression. One role of the public university is to encourage the exchange
of diverse ideas for debate and consideration. Yet, it must refrain from
taking issue with unpopular viewpoints. Neutrality in the context of a public
university is best achieved by a least restrictive means analysis which allows
maximum freedom for the expression of all ideas regardless of content. In
protecting students' first amendment rights, the university also protects itself
from student claims of repression.
Employing a least restrictive means analysis will not subvert the regulatory
powers of a public university. Regulation is not only permissible, but
essential to the proper functioning of a diverse society. A least restrictive
means test incorporated into the requirement that a regulation be "narrowly
tailored" simply requires that a university give consideration to first amend-
ment interests in the drafting and implementation of its rules. In the case
of shanties, for example, a university desiring to promote an aesthetic
campus environment may enact rules requiring that all garbage be picked
up, that the lawn and other landscaping not be damaged, and that the
premises remain in order. It may not, however, ban expressive activity
merely because it is ugly. 171 As in Peterson,172 a legitimate concern for
campus security and safety may be handled by restricting the hours during
which a demonstration takes place.173 Should violence occur, those who
have caused the violence are those who should be disciplined. If shanties
are found to interfere with classroom activities, a regulation regarding the
appropriate location, hours or volume of the communicative conduct would
most likely be sustainable.
When symbolic expression is at issue, it is unnecessary and improper to
inquire into available alternative channels of communication. A symbolic
communicator chooses a particular, unique mode to convey his message.
The manner chosen is the expression itself. In such a situation, an inquiry
into adequate substitutes does not ensure protection of the communication
but merely serves as a justification for infringement. When protected sym-
bolic speech is present and the speech occurs in a public university forum,
the inquiry should consist of no more than an assessment of the legitimate
governmental interests and a determination as to whether the means chosen
to implement these interests are no greater than are essential to further
these interests.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 140-52.
172. University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. 1200 (D.
Utah 1986).
173. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text. In Peterson, the court was careful to
restrict the hours of the demonstration to times when the expressive interests were minimal.
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CONCLUSION
It is necessary to employ a more rigorous balancing analysis in order to
determine the validity of content-neutral government regulations which
infringe on protected symbolic speech in a public university forum. A public
university provides a unique forum for expression: It encourages the ad-
vancement and exchange of ideas while maintaining the order necessary to
its survival. The best way for such a government institution to accommodate
both goals is to employ narrow and precise regulations which directly further
university concerns, while simultaneously allowing broad exercise of first
amendment freedoms. Novel modes of expression will continue to arise and
present challenges to first amendment doctrine. A successful balance can
be reached only if there is complete analysis of the competing claims and
a determination as to what is required for the preservation of each.
LAURA L. GOODMAN

